

Message Text

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SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 26, 1974,
(SALT TWO -381)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF FEBRUARY 26, 1974.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
FEBRUARY 26, 1974

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WANT TO SET FORTH OUR VIEWS ON ANOTHER OF THE
BASIC ELEMENTS THAT WE CONSIDER SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS. THIS IS THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TRAGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES.

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IN PROVIDING FOR ITS SECURITY, EACH SIDE HAS DEPLOYED

STRATEGIC FORCES WHOSE OBJECTIVE IS TO DETER NUCLEAR ATTACK THROUGH THEIR ABILITY TO RETALIATE. THE SURVIVABILITY OF THESE FORCES IS CRUCIAL TO THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR DETERRENCE ROLE. ANY THREAT TO THE SURVIVABILITY OF A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THESE FORCES COULD UNDERMINE STRATEGIC STABILITY, BOTH IN TERMS OF PROVIDING AN INCENTIVE TO TAKE OFFSETTING MEASURES AND INCREASING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN A CRISIS SITUATION. THE POTENTIAL OF ICBM'S, IN PARTICULAR, TO UNDERMINE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP SHOULD RECEIVE THE PRIORITY ATTENTION OF OUR DELEGATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSTRAINTS, ICBM FORCES COULD HAVE A COMBINATION OF YIELD AND NUMBERS OF REENTRY VEHICLES SUCH AS TO THREATEN MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE DETERRENT FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE PASSAGE OF TIME COULD MAKE THE TASK OF WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINTS MORE DIFFICULT.

AT OUR LAST MEETING, I STRESSED THE NECESSITY THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED, OF THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ICBM'S ARE POTENTIALLY THE MOST DESTABILIZING. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER NOT ONLY THE NUMBER OF ICBM'S BUT ALSO THEIR DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITIES, IN PARTICULAR THEIR MIRV POTENTIAL.

ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV'S) INTRODUCE ANOTHER, QUALITATIVE DIMENSION INTO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE DEPLOYMENT OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S HAVING A COUNTERFORCE POTENTIAL POSES THE MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES AND TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. THEREFORE, PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTROLLING ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'S.

II

IN ESTABLISHING EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON ICBM'S WITH
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MIRV'S, IT IS NECESSARY, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND IN TERMS OF THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S--THAT IS, THEIR THROW-WEIGHT.

I BELIEVE THE CONCEPT OF THROW-WEIGHT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH SIDES, THE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM INCLUDES THE

WEIGHT OF REENTRY VEHICLES PLUS THE WEIGHT OF ANY DISPENSING DEVICES AND PENETRATION AIDS. IT IS THE MAXIMUM USEFUL WEIGHT WHICH HAS BEEN FLIGHT -TESTED ON THE MISSILE BOOSTER.

ICBM THROW-WEIGHT IS AN OBJECTIVE MEASURE SUITABLY RELATED TO THE USEFUL CAPABILITY OF MISSILE BOOSTERS AND THUS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF MISSILES. IT IS THE THROW-WEIGHT WHICH DETERMINES THE COMBINATIONS OF NUMBER AND WEIGHT OF REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH THE ICBM MIRV FORCES OF EACH SIDE CAN CARRY. IT FOLLOWS THAT AS THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS INCREASES, SO DOES THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF THE ICBM FORCE, WHICH IN TURN COULD JEOPARDIZE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

III

THE TWO SIDES ARE AGREED THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT CAN TAKE INTO ACCOUNT QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS AGREED TO BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV ON JUNE 21, 1973 PROVIDED THAT LIMITATIONS CAN APPLY TO QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT AS WELL AS TO NUMBERS. THESE PRINCIPLES ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT FUTURE MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE PERMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONDITIONS TO BE SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED. THE UNITED STATES REAFFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING CERTAIN QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES AND THEREBY IMPROVE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THAT OUR DELEGATIONS GIVE PRIORITY CONSIDERATION TO THE QUALITATIVE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING LIMITA-
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TIONS ON THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'S

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT SUCH LIMITATIONS MUST PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY IN THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S DEPLOYED WITH MIRV'S. SUCH A PROVISION WOULD ENSURE EQUALITY IN THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITY OF THIS ELEMENT OF EACH SIDE'S STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THEREBY WOULD BE STRICTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

WITHIN THIS EQUAL CEILING ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S EACH SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY A NUMBER OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S THE TOTAL AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF WHICH WOULD NOT EXCEED AN EQUAL AGREED LEVEL.

THE CONCEPT WHICH I HAVE OUTLINED TODAY TO LIMIT THE
THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S WITH MIRV'S WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THOSE
ICBM'S WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH ARE INDEPENDENTLY
TARGETABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE US SIDE MINUTEMAN III ICBM'S
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THESE LIMITATIONS, AND ON THE SOVIET SIDE
THE NEW ICBM'S WHICH WERE FIRST TESTED WITH MIRV'S IN 1973 WOULD
BE INCLUDED. EXISTING ICBM'S WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES
NOT INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THIS
CEILING ON AGGREGATE ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT.

IV

THE TWO SIDES ARE AGREED THAT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN APPLY TO THEIR QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. TODAY
I HAVE DESCRIBED A CONCEPT WHICH INVOLVES A CEILING ON THE
AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBM'S DEPLOYED WITH MIRV'S. IN ORDER
TO PROVIDE
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